dissertation.

On Intuition, Instinct And The Individual.

Errors in spelling (however minor) are a rejection of the standardised requirements of linguistic perfection, it is a rejection of constraints.

When one delineates the standards of ‘trust’ in relation to morality, its deontic irrationality is perceived as absolute. By ‘deontic irrationality’, we reference the universalised spontaneity of decision when one is faced with an ethical dilemma. Thus contributing to the paradox of ‘duty’ with one’s gut feeling. The subject holds himself under the assumption of transparency and altruistic intent, wherein one’s moral intuition upholds particular axiomatic baselines that are foundational to the canonical stipulations found within society.

We begin with the initial presupposition; altruistic intentionality. When the subject is exposed to an issue regarding morality, there is an element of faux-selflessness. For instance: A man kills a strayed bear on the road with his car in order to save an elderly woman who had been rendered helpless on the curb after her own car had broken down.

This decision is a ramification of moral intuition. It is a manifestation of the egocentric will which dictates the parameters of what is ‘acceptable’. Selflessness, in the case of such a circumstance, is facilitated through the intentional killing of another organism. However, such an organism proves itself subordinate. Therefore, it is substantially ‘inferior’ in comparison to the existence of the individual. By ‘inferior’, we outline the difference in cognitive function, articulation, choice and understanding, where the human is dominant. This anthropocentric approach assumes importance over the animal. Through this, ‘selflessness’ is posited.

The totalisation of the bear into a particularly static modality of ‘beast’ or ‘violence’ (Levinas, 1961/1969) leads to a reduction of its biological and social essence. Within the circumstance, the bear was a ‘neutral’ variable. The intentionality of the human consciousness, influenced by normative conventions and the institution of media, enabled its categorisation as a ‘predator’ archetype. The ego of the subject reduces the complex variable into a designated, arbitrary label as a justification for its death. The human subconscious prioritises homocentrism in order to feel a sense of validation or heroism, thus endorsing the ego and proving altruism superficial.

Furthermore, ‘trust’ insinuates transparency, however, this transparency collapses under scrutinisation. Intuition, within this context, is contingent upon normativism and hierarchy, wherein the concept of ‘truth’ facilitates itself as a synthetically derived construct, proving deception. From a Deleuzoguattarian perspective, this anticipates a thematic congruence with the concept of territorialisation[1]. Territorialisation within this framework is described as the

[1] For a comprehensive definition and theoretical context of this term, see Appendix A1, Section 1, Item 3.

predictable, controlled principles of abstractions which mandate adherence, namely, a moral milieu.

For example, within A Thousand Plateaus it is stated: “The milieu is a codification of repetitions, which, through a refrain (a song, a specific set of actions), organizes space and "fends off chaos, that draws from the earth a set of contingent meanings that lead to identity". This act of organization is territorialisation.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 331).

Through this clarification, a necessary corollary would be that humans facilitate normative tenets [a moral milieus] as an intentional defence mechanism against what is assumed to be epistemologically and experientially deficient. It is a Striated space[2] wherein regulation and homogenisation are fundamental to the cohesion of society. Moral intuition may be defined as a territorialisation upon the individual through the restriction of one’s radical, organic expression; this may be observed through the need for stoicism when one is engaged in heated argumentations. This contributes to superficiality, or a lack of objective grounding.

In relation to territorialisation [T] and the prior example, the institution of media effectively conditions the human psyche through repetitious showcases of bears as murderous beasts incapable of mercy. Such continuous exposure towards stereotypes pre-program the individual into seeing such an animal not as a neutral variable, but rather a violent subject. This influences the perception of the masses by presupposing intent via transsubjective consensus. Simply put: collective society is ‘coded’ into assuming another’s intention due to societal agreement, even if this does not hold under scrutinisation. Thus, we come to acknowledge the stipulations of such normative structures (by normative structures, we simply mean moral intuition itself) as contingent upon widespread unanimity, not objective grounding based on logic and rationality.

Now, let us move onto the Foucauldian perspective when one discusses the moral compass, and, by extension, its intuition. Foucault (1975/1977) argues that "the soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (p. 30). Through this, we come to the subsequent conclusion of normative subjectification.[3] One’s internal moral compass is not a result of intuitionism but rather rigorous training implemented by the state. This, by extension, forces humans to maintain themselves as functionalistic commodities, wherein obedience towards authoritative institutions is implemented. One's ‘gut feeling’ is not due to an inherent, biological component. It is not followed due to its property of “truthfulness” but rather, it is a consequence of complete subjugation over one’s individualistic will. This consequence is imposed by the media.

However, this raises a fundamental question which challenges the initial premise of the argument: ‘If moral intuition is a social necessity enforced by the state as an act of control, then what about the existence of revolutionaries or dissenters?’

---

[2] For a technical, brief differentiation between striated space (the State) and smooth space (the Nomad), see Appendix A1, Section 1, Item 1 and 2.

To answer this question, we must first understand the variety of cognitive flexibility, which is individualistic and dependent on the person, alongside other factors and predispositions. Revolutionaries often have a higher tolerance for moral ambiguity, thus they refuse to fall into binaries or polarisations, despite their own radicalist stances.

By applying Arendt's (1971) critique of 'non-thinking' in accordance with the masses, and contrasting it with the stated 'marginal' affair of thinking—exemplified by the revolutionaries—one must come to acknowledge the conformity towards social cohesion rather than critical thought. By engaging in the act of 'thinking', those who are dissenters resist totalitarian governance by welcoming ambiguity, rather than simple heuristics.

Interestingly—this crystallises itself as a deceptive reterritorialisation. Revolutionaries in particular are not exempt from the influence of the state apparatus or societal conventions. What is assumed to be a breaking away from one 'code' to another, is merely a transfer of ideas which maintain the same structure as the previous power, thus ultimately failing. Such people are reterritorialised through a different institution which appeals to their approach. It is a rationalisation based on one's own foundational principles that are no doubt contingent upon prior experience.

For further clarification using Deleuzoguattarian terminology, it is an illusionary reterritorialisation due to the absence of a stable equilibrium between the enunciative assemblage[3] [the declaration of revolution and change] and the machinic assemblage[4], [the followers, the hand, pen and paper which write a new constitution] thereby creating a disjunction that is void of action (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987). The 'Line of Flight' (p. 3) within this instance of a new order, fails due to the lack of physical action and enforcement. Chiefly, this can be reduced to, once more, social and moral codes that are difficult to break away from. It is significantly easier to say than to do.

A Neurobiological Deconstruction Of Functionalities; Why is Dissent Difficult?

The difficulty can be explained through neurobiological processes, namely found within the brain. The Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex [which monitors for conflicts and sends out signals that alert the individual when they have dissented against the norm in order to pull them back into cohesion] disrupts the Dorsolateral and Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex, [dlPFC & vlPFC] which are the domains of critical thinking and resistance against societal norms and long-term habits. This explains why the machinic assemblage in its entirety is difficult to employ—certain sections of the brain are innately wired for collectivism. This capture is evidenced by Berns et al. (2005). Neuroimaging research showed that within the

[3] Enunciative Assemblage: The linguistic framework for "order-words" used by the state as a marker for the subject.
[4] Machinic Assemblage: The functional connection between heterogenous elements (technical, biological and social).

amygdala, [as well as other areas within the brain] standing up for one's belief indicated an intertwining of emotional engagement alongside perceptual judgement processes.

Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) posit that "The capacity for social exclusion to cause social pain and decrease self-esteem might be so powerful that simply viewing a scene that bears a resemblance to rejection produces these effects." Through this, we come to acknowledge the regulatory implications of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, wherein social dissent assumes discomfort. Humans are circumscribed into conformity. An individual may be capable of advanced critical thinking or metacognition, however the ability to actively rebel against normative orientations [due to the pain of rejection or ostracisation] remains superficial. The dACC can be conceptualised as a neural discrepancy monitoring system which detects deviations from desired standards.

Circling back to Arendt's concept of the burden of thinking, this may be further postulated through contemporary psychological research, namely concerning the 'Bystander effect'. Through this, we simply mean the social phenomenon whereby individuals are less likely to intervene within a situation, provided the presence of multiple people. Chekroun and Brauer (2002) articulate that: "In the presence of other people the costs of nonintervention are shared, and nonintervention becomes more likely." This is the act of the *diffusion of responsibility.* Moral intuition explicitly relies upon the biological flesh of the individual to coordinate a sufficient response, thus, it cannot rely strictly on instinct.

For what is defined as 'instinct'? particularly, within the social context. "We are the product of social relationships, or, in other words, of the groups to which we belong. We react in terms of our groups, and must always be understood as reflecting them" (Miller, 1921, p. 340). As we react within the restrictions of the collective majority, we come to realise an installation of expectation. Such expectations prohibit individualised isolation away from entitative groups. As humans, cohesion is defined as a necessity. Instinct, within such cases, is a biological and evolutionary predisposition. Within groups, there are certain enforcements in regards to behavioural attitudes. This is developed from a shared sense of altruism, reciprocity and the likes. In relation to its connection with the dACC, humans are not genetically wired for independence. Inherited, there is an endogenous susceptibility towards collectivist valuation. By 'collectivist valuation', we denote the prioritisation of the group over the individual.

The Etymological Origin Of Intuition And Instinct:

Now, before we continue further with this genealogical deconstruction, we must first delineate the differences between intuition and instinct, as to ensure their uses are not to be mistaken as interchangeable. In accordance with Duignan (2025), intuition is established as that which is an "original, independent source of knowledge." (para. 1). However, through the context of this paper, we understand this traditional definition to be a priori. Whereas, genealogically, intuition may be conceptualised as that which appears independent of experience, but remains contingent upon orientations and neurobiological precipitations,

thereby regarding itself a posteriori. Now, definitively, its meaning is understood as "a stereotyped, apparently unlearned, genetically determined behavioural pattern." Beer, C. (2017, May 18). Under the works of McDougall and behaviourism, instinct is reliant upon a designated telos—it is an attainment of a goal. Such purpose was the expression of a subjectively understood urge that stemmed from the emotionality at birth, thus constituting instinct. Each emotional instinct caters itself to a separate instinct. We must understand that instinct posits itself to be genetically and biologically innate, whereas intuition emerges as spontaneous, and, through this paper, artificial.

Let us deconstruct the etymological archeology of 'instinct' in comparison to 'intuition'.

Instinct is a derivation from the Classical Latin *instinctus,* meaning 'instigation' or 'to prick/goad'. It is a past participle of *instinguere,* which is to 'incite' or 'impel'. Wherein the prefix '*in*' (into) and root *'stiguere'* are built upon one another to instil a foundational meaning. Unto Medieval Latin, *instinctus* is used in a theological sense—an impulse from the Divine (intervention) or the Devil (temptation). From 16th century English, was engendered the formal terminology of 'instinct', moving it towards a natural impulse. This had carried itself over to the 17th/18th century, wherein 'instinct' was utilised by humans to differentiate the rational (humans) from animals (mechanical).

The root, *stinguere*, is understood to be independent from coherent thought. This is not to say that it is not a foundation of logicality. Rather, it is a spontaneous sensation that does not constitute the action of knowing. Relating to the dACC and the amygdala, there is no conscious, rightful decision, (which is preferably attached onto moral intuition) instead, it is a poking. Furthermore, we assume a linguistic connection between stinguere: To extinguish and to distinguish. The former being to "mark by pricking", by marking, we find thematic congruence with the conceptualised monitoring system of the dACC. Within this instance, when one detaches from what is expected, the brain pricks itself back into regulation.

Likewise, the Greeks constructed the term ὁρμή (hormē), this is the most consistent term. It is a derivation of the Greek verb 'ormao', which is 'to set in motion' or 'to impel'. Originally, its meaning is understood to be a vigorous impulse, or a rapid onset of movement. When situated within this position of clarity, the aforementioned instance of the man with the bear entrenches a volatile reaction towards perceived danger—a reaction that requires a 'justifiable' response. Through the growth of the Stoic movements within Ancient Greece, the term was distorted by philosophers to illustrate an appropriate driving towards one's nature (oikeiosis), wherein hormē establishes itself as a connection between the perception of a circumstance, and its subsequent action.

Physiologically, φύσις (physis) was used to describe the innateness of instinct from birth; it was a growing, fluid principle dependent on genetic predispositions. ὀρέγω (oregō), meaning to 'stretch out' is a term derived from the root of orexis (desire/appetite). This represents the nexus between the directional pull, and the irrational tendency for impulse. It is a suggestion of intentionality, insofar as the mind itself desires social cohesion

and dependability. Of equal significance is the diction ἄλογος (alogos), encapsulating the action of literal definition something that is ‘without logos’. Logos, within this case, references reason or speech. Instinctual drives are categorised as alogoi hormai, instances which occur without intervention of the rational state.

To successfully grasp the contemporary usage of ‘intuition’, as in contrast to ‘instinct’, one must first attend to its respective etymological context. Classically, it had been referred to as ‘Intueri’. Its derivation consists mainly in the following: The root, ‘in’ (into/in) alongside tueri (to look/to watch). Its original form consisted of a very spatial, literal structure, through the act of fixating intently on a subject. Scholastically, its reinvention resulted in the designation ‘intuito’, heavily influenced by Thomas Aquinas. It emerged as a direct perception of truth. However, this was restricted to God. Subsequently, this change provides a necessary contextual knowledge for later evaluations, chiefly, the transmutation of intuition from a divine intervention to a priori foundation, mirroring the Britannica definition.
Such a reconfiguration occurred during the 17th century by both Descartes and Spinoza (1677/1994), who elucidated the profound distinction between reason and intuition, utilising a mathematical dilemma (IIp40s2).

The equation presents itself as a simple ratio problem, yet is categorised into three, distinct modes of knowledge.

If the ratio provided is 1:2 = 3:*n,* then what is constitutive of *n?*

The First Kind of knowledge crystalises itself as that which is imaginative, yet not coherently internalised. *n* = 6 because it has been observed previously, rather than mechanically worked out.
The Second Kind of knowledge (ratio) is the recognition of a universalised logical proof.

(a) 2 x 3 = 6.
(b) 6/1 = 6.

Here, there is a distinct understanding of methodology, but it is still embedded within a systematic process.
Transcending these discursive modalities of knowledge, such stratifications converge upon the final, and most profound tier: The Third Kind (Scientia Intuitiva), whereby there is a lack of mediated calculation present within the conscience. The ratio of 1:2 and 3:6 is grasped instantaneously, the essence is an immediate ‘prick’ without formal inquiry. Via this articulation, intuition is posited as an action removed from the structural process of designated reasoning. In support of the initial argument, intuition does not necessitate itself as an absolute, logically thought out feeling—it is spontaneous and transcendental.

Thus, etymologically, what is perceived as objective, rational moral instinct, is merely a neurobiological, animalistic impulse. Through such linguistic tracings, we connect the underlying reification of the terminology itself, as within modernised periods of existence, we

come to acknowledge its foundation as a moral truth, not an arbitrary construct. The colonisation of both respective terms, endorsed via institutionalisation and normative conventions, is entrenched within existence as intrinsic provocations.

Following Foucault, governmentality[5] (Foucault, 1978/2007) illustrates the dictation of paradigmatic behaviourisms—wherein the depersonalisation of man in furtherance of monitorisation instills itself within society as paramount. Institutions such as the media, religion and education, utilise bio-power (Foucault, 1976/1978)—the exertion of control over the literal physical body and naturalistic processes of the population—to equilibrate the biological substrate of man, engendering a predictable, internalised mechanism of being for societal consensus. Subsequently, the latter population begin to practice a perpetual self-surveillance of their actions as a result of prolonged subjugation, proposing a tightly constricted state. Abstractions and biological components, such as instinct/intuition, become codifications of the lawful jurisdiction, wherein any deviation from what is recorded (written and enforced) becomes a localised offence. Thus, their original etymological roots are reduced to perverted distillations, where such states are perceived to be epistemologically transparent.

The Failure of The Panopticon; 'Technical Nomadology' Of The Modern Psychopath As an Agent of Deterritorialisation:

The Nomad (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987) is an individual who inhabits the Smooth space within existence, in contrast to the Striated space. They are distinguished by constant, fluid change and operate rhizomatically. Crucially, they are against the state apparatus. A fitting contemporary case study, as an analysis for the failure of the Panopticon[6] and the State, (Foucault, 1975/1995) is the modern psychopath.

This nomadic entity, devoid of remorse, alongside empathy, fragments the typical moral milieus that the latter population obey. The State apparatus is conditional upon the self-induced remorse of the Sedentary individual (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987) alongside the jurisdiction, which, through legislative punishment, forces the collective cohort into subservience. The average person is enclosed within a striated space, delineated via borders. This space is a ramification of stratification, wherein the hierarchical nature of society detains man into a necessary enclosure, disapproving of fluidity. Society assigns categorising labels, such as 'working-class', 'male'. 'Compassionate' as a tool of absolute control. This explores thematic congruence with Becker's (1963) labelling theory, whereby behaviourisms and self-identity are influenced by certain labels. The Sedentary Man is he who is normatively compliant and, subsequently, totalised into artificially manufactured labels. Such labels push the ideal of 'moral duty' and certainty with intuition, thereby endorsing the internalisation of these particular archetypes. Thus, they retain a Conceptual Sedentarism—a fixed identity, and

[5] For a contextual definition of governmentality, see Appendix A1, Section II, Item 6.
[6] The Panopticon is a metaphorical device utilised by Foucault. See Appendix A1, Section II, Item 1.

become susceptible to the Panopticon, where the individual self-monitors themselves out of fear or shame.

Contrastingly, the psychopath does not engage in such arbitrary categorisations, as they inherently feel no need to conform. Instrumentalisation succeeds (only) if the subject is receptive to Order-words (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987)
—statements that enforce a particular reality. Once this reality is established, people are tuned into Docile Bodies (Foucault, 1975/1977), referencing the predictability of utilitarian agents. The variable (the psychopath) is immune to this objectification, as the Panopticon is contingent upon the conscience and shame of the person, however, biologically, psychopaths contain a reduced capacity for certain emotionalities, as seen in Figure 2, Item 2. Unlike the dominant population, psychopaths do not have the 'mini-State' within their mind, which allows them to move within society, detached from typical experiences. The state cannot territorialise a structural anomaly, as they lack the tools to understand the variable. The nomadic subject does not introject moral values, they are viewed as mechanical advantages for navigating society without suspicion of deviance. Such anomalies do not fear legislative punishment, unlike the average individual. Jurisdictionary implications are insignificant within the variable's cultivated smooth space, something that should not be assimilated and obeyed, but rather navigated. The psychopathic variable should not be associated with the true nomadic personality illustrated by Deleuze and Guattari, instead, one must refer to the variable as a 'technical nomad'.

A technical nomad is an individual, who, due to specific neurobiological structures, are bound to a fixated state of deterritorialisation, unable to be captured by the typical moral and social frameworks embedded within society. Due to the lack of connectivity with the Prefrontal Cortex and the Amygdala, a person who displays high levels of the PCL-R are resistant to the State's attempts of territorialisation through moral codes. Instead of being owned by the homogeneous values of society, a psychopath intentionally mimics certain labels such as 'close friend' or 'lover' as superficial modalities to blend into a particular cohort. It is an intentional usage of stately values as a catalyst for personal ego/exploitation.

Neurologically, psychopaths have a smaller and less active amygdala, a study by Patrick & Cuthbert (1994) expressed that these subjects show reduced amygdala activation when exposed to distressing or fear-inducing images, their physiological responses towards certain circumstances, relative to non-psychopathic subjects, was Müller diminutive. Furthermore, posited by Caspi et al. (2002), individuals with a particular variant of the Monoamine Oxidase A gene (MAOA-L) were significantly more likely to engage in violent behaviours, chiefly, psychopaths are more likely to have this genetic predisposition, specifically during child maltreatment.

Conversely, the State may attempt to territorialise such individuals by intercepting their organic status of beings early—by this, we simply mean through neuroimaging and redundant tests. These tests expose the deficient functionalities of psychopathic subjects in comparison to non-psychopaths, thereby increasing the likelihood of medical and psychiatric intervention,

effectively reducing the complex profile into a diagnostic model of control and supervision. The concept of the “technical nomad” may also fall to the risk of perverse romanticisation, as non-psychopathic individuals may assume that the only instance of resistance is through absolute detachment and alienation from reality. However, such variables are supposedly nomadic in their nature, but their impact on others is one of profound oppression and exploitation. This romanticization would further lead to developing an intense fascination towards such non-conforming individuals, thus creating a state of constant alienation for the receiver of such attention.

The neurobiological and genetic discrepancy between the psychopath and the ‘average’ individual illustrates the true, technical “nomad”, an individual whose articulation of existence is rhizomatic and non-linear, rather than hierarchical. These statistical outliers achieve a “Line of Flight” through pure dissociation from consequence, thereby allowing them to openly deviate from normative presuppositions without feeling shame.

Broadening the scope, the caricatured reductionism of the queer subject, entrenched by institutions, predominantly the aforementioned media, provides oneself with a profound dilemma: the substantive correspondence with biopolitics and schizoanalysis as an oppressive mechanism of governance.

Contemporary American student-led research contends that the misrepresentation of gay characters subjects the LGBTQ community to arbitrary stereotypical assumptions wherein those who sexually identify as gay or lesbian cannot be a ‘real’ man or woman due to sexual preferences. Continuing with Foucault's disciplinary action, those who observe such misalignments of character internalise the intentional, often skewed behaviourisms of the actors—thereby replacing self-actualised agency. Eventually, the homosexual subject begins to police himself, exhibiting a desire for societal validation and tolerance, therefore exacerbating such detrimental stereotypes. Heteronormative consensus constitutes idealistic formulaic tropes (such as the effeminate male and the masculine female) as ‘correct’, which postulates a distinctive hyperreality conflated with fabricated sexual differences to highlight the ‘fundamental otherness’ between the heterosexual and the queer. Following the established framework, fundamental otherness encapsulates the structural opposition between the two. The term hyperreality is employed here to denote the altering of one's perception through repeated exposure to many variants of media that are not always realistic, but people learn to believe.

Society tends to pathologise such individuals by viewing them as abnormal. The brain, being the essence of neuroplasticity, can condition itself towards prejudice (primarily with dehumanising media) when viewed with that which is deemed ‘unconventional’, similar to the prior explorations concerning the neurobiological implications of dissent. The neural basis of prejudice is frequently examined within the amygdala—a complex subcortical structure located bilaterally within the medial temporal lobes. The amygdala is involved in the rapid processing of social categories, in terms of potential reward or threat. This can be characterised through reduced activity within the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a

region involved in empathy and mentalising. Furthermore, the striatum is a component found within the basal ganglia, and is broadly involved in instrumental learning and reward processes, though is usually not the focal point for fMRI studies in relation to prejudices. However, according to Amodio (2014), fMRI studies of social perception revealed "increased striatal activity in response to viewing pictures of ingroup versus outgroup members" (pg. 674). Within the context of this paper, ingroup members refer to heteronormative society, and outgroup members refer to those who identify as queer. This subconscious bias marginalises the homosexual subject, thereby pushing them into the far corners of society.

Concomitantly, intersectional analysis of Marxism introduces the fragmentation of the proletariat (Marx & Engels, 1848/2002), wherein the inherent pathologisation of queer individuals divides the collective. This division reduces the chances of a unified political force or revolution. The working-class are conditioned by the media, as the media is an ideological superstructure (Marx, 1859/1970) which reinforces the status quo, so that the otherness of the subject cannot be reconciled with the notion of alliance. This effectively territorialises the proletariat into subjugating themselves to capitalistic principles of hardworkingness and determination to fuel their exploitation. Understandably, reductive archetypes of queer individuals cannot be identified with bourgeois values, as they are perceived to be (in relation to gay males) antithetical to the hegemonic, masculine worker. This disproportion fuels horizontal hostility (Mitchell, 1974), enabling the apprehension between oppressed collectives, rather than consulting the power above them.

Such extensive evidence leads us to the most fundamental aspect of this dissertation. Namely, the state of intuition and instinct as a construction for territorialisation. Foundationally, we come to a conclusion of intersection. The State Apparatus is a functionalistic, bureaucratic machine designed for absolute control over the collective organism of society, ensuring they are kept within order. This social order is endorsed through moral intuition and instinct, both of which are neither entirely biological or synthetic. Etymologically, linguistics has been primarily utilised as a source of justification over centuries, these particular justifications have been observed through the deconstruction of both respective terms 'intuition' and 'instinct', elucidating the totalitarian structure of dominant authoritarian forces as a tactic of regulation. Through institutions and conditionings, the governmental bodies that oversee society attempt to subdue the radicalised entities which cannot be controlled. This is understood through the imprisonment of deviants who have committed crimes and disobeyed the law, thus showing citizens the consequences of dissent. Moral intuition is primarily, within this paper, a synthetic construct that is dependent on the constant assimilation of society in order for it to be successful. Intuition, as explored, is rarely influenced solely by the rational mind. Intuition, particularly, is a collection of different past experiences which influence the decision of the individual and how they react to specific circumstances, and is largely dependent on the emotions of the person themselves. It is treated as a 'moral high ground' by others who do supposedly good acts due to a perceptive intuition—however, 'goodness' cannot be constitutive of absolute 'rightness'. As there are no objective markers within reality for that which is 'good'.

Chiefly, the property of goodness is, and remains, an influence of transsubjective perception and agreement. The instinct of the individual is also biologically driven and hinges on spontaneous reactions, rather than carefully thought out logicality. Instinct, in particular, is an innate property of man, whereas intuition is a ‘gut-feeling’ based on presuppositions, most of which are subconsciously canonical. One cannot definitively say for sure whether moral instinct and intuition are entirely on one end of the spectrum, or on the other. However, both are significant mechanisms for societal cohesion, as the population, through early socialisation, learns to internalise the concept of being ‘watched’ by the law—this abstract sensation of being watched discourages ‘distasteful’ behaviour that could result in financial distress or social isolation due to prolonged imprisonment.

Both moral intuition and instinct are profound features of social territorialisation, the Sedentary socially conditions the masses into a state of absolute subservience through the distortion of original terminology, and the fundamental expectation of conformity; thereby utilising the concepts of intuition and instinct, as a profound, universal meter of the self, and how, in the instance of disobedience, or supposed ‘immorality’, the state immediately institutionalises the individual to maintain absolute control over the majority, this also carries on into the conversation of the queer individual.

glossary.

Appendix A1: Glossary of Theoretical and Clinical Terminology.

Due to the dense, interdisciplinary nature of this work, an appendix is foundational towards absolute understanding.
I intend to split this appendix into particular sections for each philosopher/field for easier navigation. The authors will be listed, alongside their respective books/papers.

Section I: Nomadology and Territorialisation: Deleuze and Guattari.
Primary Source: A Thousand Plateaus (1987).

1. Striated Space: A regulated, gridded space through multiple means, whether moral codes, the jurisdiction or physical borders. Within the context of this dissertation, this is defined by such restrictions keeping subjects in line.

2. Smooth Space: The open, unregulated space of the nomad. Movement is organic and unrestrained, and it is not dictated by boundaries.

3. Territorialisation: Much like the Striated Space, territorialisation is centered around regulations and keeping things predictable and in order. It is, within this dissertation, defined by normative conventions.

4. Deterritorialisation: The breaking away from rigid frameworks. In this body of work, it is characterised by the psychopathic subjects exit from the moral territory of the State apparatus.

5. Order-Words: Statements that not only communicate, but also actively shape a reality. It is a categorisation of the individual.

6. The Sedentary Individual: An individual whose identity and movement are dictated by the regulated space of the state.

Section II: Disciplinary Power: Michel Foucault.
Primary Sources: Discipline and Punish (1975), The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1. (1976).

1. Panopticon: A metaphorical term used for the act of self-surveillance and social control. This constant observation leads to individuals regulating their own behaviour.

2. Docile Bodies: The physical body, transformed by institutions into predictable, subservient units.

3. Biopower: A technology of power used to manage the population, it concerns itself with public health, statistics and biological processes. Moral intuition, for instance, is a biopolitical tool that ensures the regulation of the population.

4. Subjectification: The treatment of the individual into a subject, an identity is given, but compliance is demanded in turn.

5. Governmentality: Refers to governed practices (legislative, social and biological) through which a State manages its population and encourages self-governance using these practices.

Section IV: Neurobiology and the Mind: General Terminology.

1. Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex: A brain region involved in cognitive control, decision-making and emotional regulation. It is crucial in conflict monitoring. It is the agent of territorialisation.

2. Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex: Located in the upper-outer position of the frontal is involved in high level cognitive processing, such as working memory, cognitive flexibility and abstract reasoning.

3. Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex: It is involved in the attention system and is part of a complex working memory system.

4. Amygdala: A small structure in the brain that is responsible for emotional processing, particularly fear and aggression. It is the disrupter of the prefrontal cortex.

Section V: Marxist Terminology
Primary Source: The German Ideology (1984), Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1970).

1. Ideological Superstructure: Stereotypes in media are used to reinforce the status quo which keeps the working-class divided.

2. Fragmentation of the Proletariat: Dividing the working-class so that they cannot unify.

3. False Consciousness: Working-class collectives are conditioned to view queer subjects as other, not allies.

4. Horizontal Hostility: Oppressed groups being hostile towards one another, and ignoring the exploitation of their beings by the bourgeoisie.

Section VI: General Terminology:

1. Precipitates: To do, make, or act suddenly without much consideration. It is an impulsive action.

2. Engender: To cause or produce something.

3. Normative presuppositions/Canonical orientation/Transubjective societal consensus: Expected behaviour that is widely agreed upon within society.

4. Deontic irrationality: The universal spontaneity of irrational decision making—it is so irrational and universalised, that it seems to be a duty for man to react in such a way.

5. Entitative: A group of people with a unified identity.

references.

References:

Arendt, H. (1971). *Thinking and moral considerations*: A lecture. Social Research, 38(3), 417–446.

Amodio, D. M. (2014). The neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, *15*(10), 670–682. The neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping

Berns, G. S., Chappelow, J., Zink, C. F., Pagnoni, G., Martin-Skurski, M. E., & Richards, J. (2005). *Neurobiological correlates of social conformity and independence during mental rotation*. Biological Psychiatry, 58(3), 245–253.

Becker, H. S. (1963). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance. Free Press.

Caspi, A., McClay, J., Moffitt, T. E., Mill, J., Martin, J., Craig, I. W., Taylor, A., & Poulton, R. (2002). Role of genotype in the cycle of violence in maltreated children. *Science*, *297*(5582), 851–854. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1072290

Chekroun, P., & Brauer, M. (2002). The bystander effect and social control behavior: The effect of the presence of others on people's reactions to norm violations. *European* Journal of Social Psychology, 32(6), 853–867. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.12

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia* (B. Massumi, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1980).

Duignan, B. (2025). *Intuition*. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/intuition

Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2004). Why rejection hurts: The neurocognitive overlap between physical and social pain. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *8*(7), 294–300. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.05.010

Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.).

Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality: Vol. 1. An introduction* (R. Hurley, Trans.). Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1976).

Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France,* 1977–1978 (G. Burchell, Trans.). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1978).

Miller, H. A. (1921). The group as an instinct. *American Journal of Sociology*, *27*(3), 334–343.

Marx, K. (1970). *A contribution to the critique of political economy* (S. W. Ryazanskaya, Trans.). Progress Publishers. (Original work published 1859).

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2002). *The Communist Manifesto* (S. Moore, Trans.). Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1848).

Mitchell, J. (1974). *Psychoanalysis and feminism*. Pantheon Books.

Patrick, C. J., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1994). Psychophysiology of fear and anxiety: A tripartite model. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *103*(3), 453–466.

Spinoza, B. (1994). *A Spinoza reader: The Ethics and other works* (E. Curley, Ed. & Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1677).